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Abstract—Currently, perimeter-based approaches are the
mainstay of cybersecurity. While this paradigm is necessary,
there is mounting evidence of its insufficiency with respect to
sophisticated and coordinated attacks. In contrast to perimeter-
based security, mission-centric cybersecurity provides awareness
of how attacks can influence mission success and therefore focuses
resources for mitigating vulnerabilities and protecting critical
assets. This is strategic as opposed to tactical perimeter-based
cybersecurity. We propose MISSION AWARE, which assists in the
identification of parts of a system that destabilize the overall
mission of the system if compromised. MISSION AWARE starts
with a structured elicitation process that leads to hazards analysis.
It employs hierarchical modeling methods to capture mission
requirements, admissible functional behaviors, and system ar-
chitectures. It then generates evidence—attacks applicable to
elements that directly correlate with mission success. Finally,
MISSION AWARE traces evidence back to mission requirements
to determine the evidence with the highest impact relative to
mission objectives.
I. INTRODUCTION
High integrity Systems and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
often integrate a diverse set of hardware and software compo-
nents to provide critical service capabilities. These components
include advanced computing platforms, sensors, control systems
and communication networks to monitor operation conditions
and control system assets as required for their underlying
mission. Examples of their every day but include energy
operation centers, wearable devices, connected automobiles,
defense and military coordinated operations and homeland
security monitoring centers, to name a few. The critical nature
of these systems requires thorough, effective, and affordable
security analysis throughout their lifecycle but especially at
the early concept development phase.
This is supported by the defense community where it is
estimated that 70-80% of the decisions affecting safety and
security are made in the early concept development phase of
any project [1], [2]. Based on the above insights, we identify
two distinct needs in the area of CPS security: (i) the need to
derive resilience from both a system’s and a mission context
and (ii) the need to establish systematic risk-based security
analysis early in a systems lifecycle that goes beyond security
compliance checklists.
The above needs are illustrated by recent reports on vulnera-
bilities in systems that are not just critical to infrastructure but
This research is based upon work supported by the Systems Engineering
Research Center under Award No. 2017-RT-172.
could also lead to potential loss of life. One such example is the
Boeing 757 which has been shown to have serious exploitable
vulnerabilities in a non-laboratory environment [3].
Perimeter-based security approaches demonstrate some suc-
cess in protecting CPS but they tend to be prescriptive (e.g., use
a firewall, encrypt communication channels, etc.) without being
aware of the nature and purpose of the system and its mission.
In contrast, mission-centric cybersecurity presupposes that there
is a specific expected service that needs to be protected and,
hence, provides adequate justification for potential defenses.
Therefore, mission-centric cybersecurity provides awareness of
how sophisticated cyber attacks can influence mission success
and, consequently, focuses system designers’ resources and
efforts in mitigating potential vulnerabilities [4].
To directly address the above challenges we propose MISSION
AWARE, a strategic, model-based, and proactive cybersecurity
approach. A strategic approach starts by understanding the
mission of the system, what it is expected to do and what
potential hazards it might face, who it is expected to serve,
and for what purpose. By answering these questions, we can
then model top-to-bottom (1) the mission requirements, (2) the
admissible functional behaviors, and a potential realized model
of a (3) system structure that can fulfill the defined service. This
approach results in systematic analysis by combining all three
domains in a well-formed mission specification. Finally, we use
public vulnerability repositories (e.g., CAPEC,1 CWE,2 CVE,3
etc.) to assess the security posture of the critical subsystems
that directly relate to potential mission degradation which we
term evidence.
The main contributions of this paper are:
∙ provision of information and the analysis of system infor-
mation to build assurance artifacts on mission survivability
in the presence of intelligent threat actors;
∙ well-formed, traceable modeling framework that captures
the mission requirements, admissible behaviors, and archi-
tectural elements;
∙ identification and reduction of system components that
need to be analyzed in order to assure mission success;
and
1Common Attack Pattern Enumeration & Classification, capec.mitre.org
2Common Weakness Enumeration, cwe.mitre.org
3Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, cve.mitre.org
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Fig. 1. The MISSION AWARE approach conducts requirements elicitation, hazard analysis, SysML modeling and analyzes the security posture through evidence
and graph representation to provide a holistic mission-centric view.
∙ utilization and application of realistic threat information,
termed evidence, to assess mission impact.
We evaluate MISSION AWARE on a military mission, specif-
ically an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance
mission.
II. MISSION-CENTRIC SECURITY APPROACH
The MISSION AWARE methodology, as the name implies,
is grounded on understanding the expected service of the
system, i.e. mission, and the goals of the mission from various
stakeholders’ perspectives (Fig 1). In this section we discuss
the basic elements and workflow of MISSION AWARE.
MISSION AWARE begins with a structured elicitation process
from various stakeholders, termed the WAR ROOM, that first
defines the mission scenarios and then identifies both the
possible mission hazards and the type of threat space that is
going to be associated with the system architecture (Fig. 1 (a)
and Fig. 2). The WAR ROOM is the driving concept in MISSION
AWARE. The typical stakeholders ensemble are supervisory
staff, commanders, operations staff, end users, and subject
domain experts.
Following the WAR ROOM the methodology branches into two
paths. The first path addresses the modeling of the target system
architecture with respect to functionality, mission constraints
and requirements of CPS, admissible behaviors, restrictions,
and hazards of the mission. The second path identifies and
assesses threats to the specified mission. Along this path, the
MISSION AWARE methodology discovers relevant attack infor-
mation at the earliest possible stage of systems development.
Threat information (e.g., attack patterns, vulnerabilities, and
weaknesses) mined from public attack vector databases are used
to drive system vulnerability detection and mission impact.
Modeling. The purpose of the modeling effort in MISSION
AWARE is to capture the stakeholders’ beliefs in the form
of records and artifacts, provide a systematic framework to
analyze these artifacts, and construct a specification in SysML
that can grow and be modified throughout the lifecycle of the
system. Specifically, these artifacts are analyzed in a systematic
approach based on Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and
Process (STAMP), which is detailed in Section IV, which
captures the potential hazards the mission might face in a
tabular format (Fig. 1 (b)). The outcomes of this systems-
theoretic analysis are, then, captured into a hierarchical Systems
Modeling Language (SysML) [5] model of the target system.
The target system model is segmented in three domains:
mission, behavior, and architecture (Fig. 1 (c) and Fig. 3). The
SysML model can be further extended and modified to represent
the changes in the mission of the system, the behaviors, as
well as architectural changes.
Attack Vector Space. The attack vector space allows us
to provide real information about attack patterns, weaknesses,
and vulnerability associated with the model. This allows us to
not only find the hazards that might cause mission degradation
but also assess how likely the threat is based on evidence.
Using the elicited information the analyst is, also, informed
on which databases are applicable to the system and its
corresponding mission (Fig. 1 (e)). Through the databases,
we extract vulnerability information that can potentially violate
the mission-level requirements and the corresponding system
architecture (Fig. 1 (f)). This step can be complemented with
further information after the system architecture has been
modeled.
Impact. The final step in MISSION AWARE is to ascertain
through the model and its corresponding attack vector space, if
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there can be significant impact on the mission. To assess this
impact and relate attacks to potential hazards, the outputs of
both paths are transformed into graph metamodels that represent
the mission specification and its associated evidence. The use
of graph metamodels are important for two specific reasons.
First, graphs in MISSION AWARE carry important model attribute
information that can map to attack vectors of the components
of a system. Second, graphs are a common formalism for both
attack and system models and have been proven practical in
several contexts in cybersecurity [6]. This allows us to assess
the impact of an adversarial event by finding the paths that
violate mission-level requirements (Fig. 1 (g)).
Feedback. The analysis can be repeated as many times
as needed to provide confidence in mission success by feeding
back the results (mission impact) to the WAR ROOM.
III. REQUIREMENTS & MISSION INFORMATION ELICITATION
The WAR ROOM is a guided elicitation activity that leverages
the strengths of different stakeholders to identify mission
goals, objectives, unacceptable outcomes, expectations, and
procedures. It also makes an initial prognosis for the threat
level that the mission and the system might combat. Such
stakeholders include the mission owner, the system operator,
attack analysts, and the acquisition cost experts. Analysts
engage these stakeholders by asking a series of queries and
proposing hypothetical scenarios to generate the information
listed above (Fig. 2). For example, an analyst may ask a UAV
operator how they might handle the malfunction of an imaging
payload, or ask an attack analyst how mission timing can affect
the types of threats to the system. By maturing from the fuzzy
front end of a narrative description to a rough block diagram
to a robust system model, we are able to concretely capture
the diverse information in a single SysML model.
Through the WAR ROOM exercise, we are able to encode
mission requirements as high-level properties to be preserved.
Additionally, through expert input about mission objectives
and unacceptable outcomes we are able to pinpoint and
classify critical components of a system, their interaction
with users and the environment, and the relationship between
those critical assets and the mission. The WAR ROOM directly
informs the subsequent hazard analysis in the next step of the
MISSION AWARE process with unacceptable outcomes, potential
hazards, and procedural behaviors. This is advantageous as
this information is now produced explicitly by the stakeholders
rather than derived or assumed by the analysts. The results of
the WAR ROOM are also important in deciding which databases
are applicable to the mission and its corresponding system
based on the threat analysis information provided by the
stakeholders.
IV. DISTURBANCE AND CONSEQUENCE MODELING
Systems theory views a system as a hierarchy, with each
level imposing a set of constraints on the behavior of the
level below. When these constraints break down, so does the
safety and security of the system. STAMP [7] is an accident
causality model that describes these breakdowns. In the context
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Fig. 2. The WAR ROOM elicitates information from stakeholders.
of MISSION AWARE, an adversary exploits vulnerabilities to
ultimately change the behavior of a system and affect the
outcome of a mission. STAMP allows us to analyze unintended
system behavior as a control problem rather than a component
failure problem, which enables a holistic investigation of both
safety and security.
More specifically, STAMP extends traditional causality mod-
eling beyond component failures to include human interactions,
the environment, organizational structures, and hazardous
interactions with non-failing components. Inadequate control
or handling of these factors lead to losses, not just simple
component failure. This concept proves useful for the MISSION
AWARE approach as it shifts focus from preventing failures to
enforcing constraints; in other words, it helps strategize how
functionality can be preserved in the face of disruptions, rather
than attempting to prevent all disruptions.
While STAMP mainly focuses on system safety, its principles
can be applied to help foster a holistic approach to increasing
system security and resilience. However, Systems Theoretic
Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) is an extension of
STAMP that applies the same concepts of enforcing safety
constraints to control vulnerabilities [8], [9]. STPA-Sec shifts
the focus of STAMP from designing against unintentional
disruptions (safety) to protecting against intentional disruptions
(security). More specifically, STPA-Sec operates from the top-
down by outlining unacceptable losses or outcomes within the
mission to establish clear priorities that both guide later analysis
as well as influence potential future solutions. Furthermore, the
STPA-Sec model systematically encodes these unacceptable
losses, the hazardous conditions that could lead to these losses,
and the control actions and circumstances under which these
actions become hazardous.
The STPA-Sec model generates the links between the mission
requirements and information from the WAR ROOM and the be-
havior of the system while attempting to complete that mission.
The stakeholder inputs about the mission directly feed into
the top levels of the STPA-Sec analysis, and in particular the
unacceptable losses and the prioritization of each. Furthermore,
the behavior and functionality described in the model provides
the basis for a model of the system’s architecture which helps
create the traceability between hardware and software through
mission requirements. This allows the analysis to identify and
evaluate potential vulnerabilities with respect to their effects
on the outcome of the mission rather than blindly trying to
3
Mission Domain—What objectives must the 
integrated system achieve, and what hazards 
must it avoid?
Behavioral Domain—What are the functions 
required in the context of the mission?
Architectural Domain—How are all of the 
subsystems organized, connected, and related 
to each other to achieve mission objectives? 
Co
ns
tra
int
s
Co
ns
tra
int
s
Tr
ac
e
Tr
ac
e
Fig. 3. The hierarchy is modeled top-to-bottom and traced bottom-to-top.
eliminate gaps in security, a key tenet to the MISSION AWARE
approach.
V. HIERARCHICAL SYSML MODELING
System models are developed to simultaneously achieve two
objectives. The first is to ensure fidelity to an actual system’s
(or system-of-systems’) behavior. The second is to allow the
model to be “virtually attacked”, and it is this latter objective
that requires additional semantics compared to a typical SysML
modeling effort.
The SysML modeling starts by constructing the mission
requirements, system functions, and system structure. These
are the baseline models that correspond to each of the domains
(Fig. 3) and include all the attributes and behaviors above.
Mission requirements, system functions, and system structure
are as encoded in the following standard SysML diagram types,
respectively: requirements diagrams; activity diagrams, which
also encode behavior related to STAMP and STPA from Sec IV;
and block definition and internal block diagrams.
A second modeling pass completes the mission specification
by tracing mission requirements to system functions and
system structure (in SysML this is achieved by extending
the requirements diagrams). This allows an analyst to identify
vulnerabilities of system components and then find all trace
paths that impact mission requirements and better understand
the security needs not only based on the utilized system but
also on the mission requirements. Ideally it causes a reduction
of the architectural elements that need to be considered in
the security evaluation; however, in the worst-case scenario
a mission might be impacted by all elements in the system
architecture model.
In order for the model to be “attackable” we construct
the following semantics, i.e., descriptors and behaviors, that
capture:
∙ Information flow: Types of information flow for Input
and Output ports.
∙ Properties: Information flows or components associated
with confidentiality, integrity, availability, and also, restric-
tions, sharing, etc.
∙ Functionality: What function a sub-system has relative
to the whole system and what service it provides
∙ Non-functional attributes: Timeliness, responsiveness,
user interaction, etc.
∙ Interface interactions How a component interacts with
users and entities.
These semantics allow us to map potential attack vectors
using the architectural specification of the system. This in turn,
provides evidence that the impact to the mission specifica-
tion is realizable based on historic reported attack patterns,
weaknesses, and vulnerabilities.
VI. GRAPH METAMODELS
In this section, we construct graph-theoretic formalisms that
act as metamodels for assessing the overall security posture
of CPS based on their mission-level requirements, admissible
behaviors, and system architecture.
A. Model
We produce a common language formalism for security
assessment for mission-centric CPS. This formalism is both
an extension and a generalization of the language presented
by Bakirtzis et al. [10], making connections to the SysML
encapsulation and the hierarchy produced by the systems-
theoretic approach. It also introduces the notions of attack
chain and mission impact. The following terminology is one
of potentially several ways to represent the concepts present in
this paper.
Definition 1 (Mission Requirements). The mission require-
ments of a cyber-physical system is a graph 푅 ∶=
(푉푅, 퐴푅, src푅, tgt푅), where 푉푅 the vertices of 푅; 퐴푅 the arrowsof 푅; src푅, tgt푅 ∶ 퐴푅 → 푉푅. 푉푅 represents the requirements;
퐴푅 the relations of each requirements; and src푅, tgt푅 the typeof relation, i.e., prerequisite or refinement.
Definition 2 (System Function). The function of a cyber-
physical system is a graph 퐹 ∶= (푉퐹 , 퐴퐹 , src퐹 , tgt퐹 ), where
푉퐹 the set of verices of 퐹 ; 퐴퐹 the set of arrows of 퐹 ; and
src퐹 , tgt퐹 ∶ 퐴퐹 → 푉퐹 . 푉퐹 represents the admissible behaviors,i.e., functionality, non-functional attributes, and interface
interactions, based on the requirements in 푅, 퐴퐹 defines theadmissible decision flow allowed by 푅, and src퐹 , tgt퐹 thepossible directionality between admissible decisions that exist
in 퐹 .
Definition 3 (System Structure). The structure of a cyber-
physical system is a graph Σ ∶= (푉Σ, 퐴Σ, srcΣ, tgtΣ,Σ), where
푉Σ is the set of vertices of Σ; 퐴 is the set of arrows of
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Σ; srcΣ, tgtΣ ∶ 퐴Σ → 푉Σ, and Σ is the set of descriptorsof Σ. 푉Σ represents the components of a cyber-physicalsystem that implement the admissible behaviors defined by
퐹 , 퐴Σ the information flow communication links to fullyimplement the admissible behaviors defined in 퐹 , srcΣ, tgtΣthe directionality of the possible cyber or physical interactions
between components, and Σ the associated cyber attributes,i.e., properties, for a given vertex or interaction that map to
potential attack vectors.
In this instance, the mission requirements are encoded in
requirement diagrams, the system function is encoded in activity
diagrams, and the system structure of the CPS is encoded in
internal block and block definition diagrams. Thus, we utilize
all three fundamental categories in SysML, namely, behavior,
requirements, and structure diagrams. These define the primitive
artifacts in MISSION AWARE.
Definition 4 (Mission Specification). The mission specifi-
cation of a cyber-physical system is a graph 푆 ∶=
(푉푆 , 퐴푆 , src푆 , tgt푆 ,푆 ), where 푉푆 ⊆ 푉 such that 푉 =
푉푅 ∪ 푉퐹 ∪ 푉Σ completing the specification by including allthe information presented in the mission requirements, how
those relate to the system function, and finally how they
are realized through the system structure; 퐴푆 the set ofarrows that define associativity between any of the elements
presented in the vertices that compose the mission, i.e.,
mission requirements, system function, and system structure;
src푆 , tgt푆 ∶ 퐴푆 → 푉푆 define the directionality of the arrowsin 푆, and 푆 the descriptors derived from system structure,
Σ, such that 푆 ⊆ Σ.
The implication of the mission specification definition is
that once all primitive artifacts are constructed, the mission
requirements are traced to their necessary behavioral and
architectural elements. This constructs a fully traceable model
without changing the completeness of the model. This way,
we are able to potentially reduce the number of architectural
components that are assessed for their security posture. It
follows that if the analysis is systematic, the number of security
tools or resilient preemption and mitigation strategies can be
reduced to just the architectural components that are present
in 푆 and not necessarily the full graph Σ.
Definition 5 (Attack Vector Space). An attack vector space
is a graph AV ∶= (푉AV, 푅AV, srcAV, tgtAV, AV), where 푉 theset of vertices of AV; 푅AV is the set of relationships of AV,
srcAV, tgtAV ∶ 푅AV → 푉AV, in which 푉AV represents the attackvectors, 푅AV the related attack vectors of a given component,
srcAV, tgtAV the directionality of the relationship, that is whichone is more abstract, and AV the possible types of a relationshipbetween two vertices.
We model possible attacker actions through the attack vector
graph defined above. This model captures all information
relevant to the system (as defined in the WAR ROOM) and
its mission but is largely a superset that is constructed by using
public vulnerability repositories. For example, in the case that
CAPEC, CWE, CVE are used for the analysis, then the vertices,
푉AV, will be instances of each of the databases and the arrows
푅AV the relations between entries. We introduce the conceptof types, AV, that further categorize what a relation means.These can take the form of intrarelationship if they are within
the same database and interrelationship if they are not. We
assume that the text that describes each entry is encoded in
each vertex within 푉AV.
B. Finding Applicable Attacks
One of the major subgoals of MISSION AWARE is to assess
the security posture of a CPS model so that we can ultimately
produce systems that are secure by design with respect to
mission objectives. To do so we need to be able to map attack
vectors from the attack vector space to subsystems from the
system structure. Therefore, we require a clear formalism that
defines the path in which attacks match subsystems. We term
such a path the attack chain, which not only defines orphan
nodes or single edges but also, possible sequential attacks
that could lead to full mission degradation even if the attacks
applied singularly would not.
Definition 6 (Evidence). The evidence associated with a
given system structure vertex or arrow is a function evidence ∶푆 → 풫 (푉AV), where 푆 is the set of descriptors specifiedin 푆 and 풫 (푉AV) the power set of the vertices describing theattack vectors 푉AV in 퐴푉 .
An immediate consequence of the definition for evidence
is that the set of attacks associated with a descriptor, 푆 ,will produce a variety of evidence, some of which is relevant
and some of which is irrelevant. Specifically, some evidence
is applicable to the subcomponent and therefore the system
architecture, while some of it will be false-positive entries
associated with that system, Σ, and specifically with some
descriptor, 푆 .
Definition 7 (Relevant Evidence). Relevant evidence is evi-
dence that is truly applicable to the mission and its correspond-
ing system, i.e. the true-positives that result from the function
푒푣푖푑푒푛푐푒. A piece of evidence’s relevance is a function of both
the descriptions in the attack vectors and the descriptions of
the system components. However, an attack, 푉AV, such that 퐷푆is in 풫 (푉AV), may not be applicable due to other aspects ofthe system component that contains 퐷푆 . Therefore, relevantevidence is a function rel-evidence ∶ (푆 , 푉AV, 푉Σ) → 퐸,where 퐸 ⊆ 풫 (푉AV).
A descriptor, 퐷푆 , is unique and applies to a single elementof a system; even if multiple components have the same or
similar attributes, a namespace demarcates the descriptor for
those components. The method of how these descriptors are
chosen to sufficiently represent a component and how they map
to potential attacks is described by Bakirtzis et al. [10].
Property 1 (Attack Chain). Let the system structure graph
be Σ ∶= (푉Σ, 퐴Σ, srcΣ, tgtΣ,Σ). An attack chain 푛 in Σ is a
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path, denoted 푝 ∈ Vulnerable Path(푛)Σ , which is a head-to-tailsequence
푝 = (푣0
푎1
←←←←←→ 푣1
푎2
←←←←←→ 푣2
푎3
←←←←←→⋯
푎푛
←←←←←→ 푣푛)
of arrows in Σ, denoted 푣0
[
푎1, 푎2,… , 푎푛
]. This path is con-
structed if and only if there exists an attack vector belonging
in the attack vector space that can attach to a given arrow or
vertex. Any given set of vulnerable paths in Σ is denoted by:
Vulnerable PathΣ ∶=
⨆
푛∈ℕ
Vulnerable Path(푛)Σ
A single attack at any given vertex defines a trivial path 푣 [ ],while a single attack on an edge defines a path of length 1.
These define the canonical isomorphisms Vulnerable Path(0)Σ ≅
푉Σ and Vulnerable Path(1)Σ ≅ 퐴Σ.
C. Mission Impact
An important notion in MISSION AWARE is that of mission
impact. This impact trace spans across the primitive artifacts
that define the mission specification and can inform analysts
and stakeholders about the possible mission-level violations in
the presence of a specific attack or attack combination. This is
a property of the top-to-bottom modeling approach, which is
encoded in the mission specification graph 푆.
Property 2 (Impact Trace). Let the mission specification
graph be 푆 ∶= (푉푆 , 퐴푆 , src푆 , tgt푆 ,푆 ). Then, the impact trace
푚 is a path in 푆 that spans across the architecture, functions,
and requirements associated with the mission specification. This
path is denoted 푖 ∈ Impact Trace(푚)푆 , which is a head-to-tailsequence
푖 = (푣0
푎1
←←←←←→ 푣1
푎2
←←←←←→ 푣2
푎3
←←←←←→⋯
푎푛
←←←←←→ 푣푛)
of arrows in 푆, denoted 푣0
[
푎1, 푎2,… , 푎푛
]. This path is
constructed if and only if there exists evidence for a given
architectural element in 푉푆 ⊆ 푉Σ. Any given set of impacttraces in 푆 is denoted by:
Impact Trace푆 ∶=
⨆
푚∈ℕ
Impact Trace(푚)푆
Ultimately, the set of impact traces, Impact Trace푆 , is theresult of the analysis that is reported to the stakeholders and
facilitates which preemption and mitigation strategies will be
utilized to assure mission success.
D. Standard Input to Other Analysis Techniques
By constructing this formalism, we are able to encode
all inputs of our analysis in a common format, that is
GraphML [11]. GraphML is one of the more mature graph
formats. It is, also, valid XML thus allowing us to use standard
general-purpose libraries to easily parse and modify it, and is
fully extensible.
In general, there are two specific reasons for adopting graph
theory as a common language of system security assessment.
The first reason is to allow us to define certain properties and
constraints of MISSION AWARE. The second reason is to share
a standard schema for encoding and accessing such types of
information.
VII. EVALUATION
We evaluate the methodology in a military use case,
specifically an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance
mission. We start by producing the results of the WAR ROOM
structured discussion and continue by applying STPA-Sec
hazard analysis to identify the losses, hazards, and control
actions associated with the mission. This allows us to create
representative models of the mission, behavior, and structure
in requirements diagrams, activity diagrams, and internal block
definition and block definition diagrams in SysML respectively,
which we then represent as graphs through GraphML. Through
the graph structures we produce the evidence for the mission-
critical components, potential vulnerable paths, and impact
traces.
A. Experimental Setting
We start by producing the WAR ROOM artifacts through a
structured elicitation of information. First, we produce the
mission and system description by conducting a structured
discussion between stakeholders. (In this case segmented
to groups acting as military commanders, system designers,
and analysts.) Once this is completed the analysts further
query the rest of the mission stakeholders about the specific
mission objectives, potential causes of failure, and other various
hypothetical scenarios, such as impact of system functionality
loss. Through this structured discussion the stakeholders
provide the analysts with the possible threat-space associated
with the specific mission. This recorded, informal information
produced by the WAR ROOM allows the analysts to produce
a systems-theoretic hazards analysis where a more formal
model begins to emerge to describe potential consequences and
disturbances to the mission given a system fault (intrinsic to
the system or constructed maliciously by an intelligent threat
actor).
The output of the hazards analysis is then represented in
a tabular format. The information present in those tables is
encoded in the SysML model of the mission requirements
in requirements diagrams, admissible functional behaviors in
activity diagrams, and system architecture in block definition
diagrams and internal block diagrams using the standard
semantics provided in each diagram definition. The subsequent
modeling step is to produce the complete mission specification
by creating the traces between all model domains in the
requirements diagram to encode the rest of the information
provided by the WAR ROOM and hazard analysis.
Finally, following the definitions in Section VI, we represent
the mission requirements as the graph 푅, the system functions
as the graph 퐹 , and the system structure as the the graph
Σ. Through these primitive artifacts we construct the mission
specification as the graph 푆 and use the system structure Σ
to find all evidence that can violate the mission objectives
and admissible behaviors. This evidence, constructed through
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Table I
A FRAGMENT OF UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES FOR A UAV RECONNAISSANCE MISSION PRODUCED BY STPA-SEC
Unacceptable Loss Description
L1 Loss of resources, e.g., human, matériel, due to inaccurate, wrong, or absent information
L2 Loss of classified or otherwise sensitive technology, knowledge, or system(s)
L3 Loss of strategically valuable matériel, personnel, or civilians due to loss of control of system(s)
Table II
A FRAGMENT OF HAZARDS THAT CAN CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES PRODUCED BY STPA-SEC
Hazard Worst-case Environment Associated Losses
H1—Absence of information Imminent threat goes undetected L1: Manpower, matériel, territory, etc.
H2—Distributing wrong or inaccurate information Threat is incorrectly identified or
characterized
L1: Manpower, matériel, territory, etc.
H3—Loss of control in unacceptable area UAV is lost in enemy territory
and suffers minimal damage in
crash/landing
L2, L3: Compromise of critical systems,
intelligence, and/or other potentially
classified information or technology
Table III
A FRAGMENT OF HAZARDOUS CONTROL ACTIONS AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL PRODUCED BY STPA-SEC
Control Action Not Providing
Causes Hazard
Providing
Causes Hazard
Incorrect Timing
or Order
Stopped Too Early
or Applied Too Long
CA 4.1
Move control surface
H1, H2, H3: UAV does not
avoid inappropriate area, or
field of view not adjusted prop-
erly
H1, H2, H3: UAV enters
inappropriate area
H1, H2, H3: UAV fails to avoid
inappropriate area
H1, H2, H3: UAV temporarily
enters inappropriate area
CA 4.2
Take picture or collect data
H1, H2: Needed information
not collected
H1, H2: Wrong information
collected
H1, H2: Needed information
not collected
H1, H2: Needed information
not collected or inadequate in-
formation collected
CA 4.3
Send data/feedback
H1, H2: Information not sup-
plied to controller
H2, H3: Wrong information
sent to controller
H1, H2, H3: Information not
sent to controller at correct
time
H1, H2, H3: Inadequate infor-
mation sent to controller
Table IV
SAFETY CONSTRAINTS FOR A FRAGMENT OF COMPONENT-LEVEL CONTROL ACTIONS.
Related Control Action Safety Constraint
SC 4.1
Move Control Surface
Control surfaces shall only move upon receiving authentic commands
from the flight control system
SC 4.2
Take Picture or Collect Data
Data collection shall only occur upon authentic command from the
operator
SC 4.3
Send Data/Feedback
The component shall relay collected data or send feedback to the
appropriate monitors at regular intervals
cve-search,4 is then assessed as relevant or irrelevant by the
analysts, the relevant evidence then constructs the attack vector
space graph, 퐴푉 . Relevant evidence from 퐴푉 is then used
to find potential vulnerable paths, Vulnerable PathΣ in thesystem structure, Σ that can violate mission objectives in 푆
and produce the impact traces with the highest likelihood of
mission degradation, Impact Trace푆 .
4CVE-SEARCH PROJECT, cve-search.org
B. Results
The WAR ROOM exercise begins with the definition of a
tactical reconnaissance mission utilizing a small UAV with an
on-board imagery payload. This particular mission requires that
military commanders receive visual information about enemy
activities, or lack thereof, in an area of interest to support other
future or ongoing missions. Mission failures results from the
absence of the reconnaissance information that the UAV would
provide. Thus, the GPS and imaging payload are the critical
components to mission success since the visual information
needs to be linked to a location. Furthermore, vehicle loss or
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Fig. 4. The Σ graph represents the architectural topology of the system. This graph is initially constructed in SysML in internal block and block definition
diagrams and then extracted to graph form for analysis. (Further information, e.g., descriptors, are not visualized but are accessible through the schema.)
capture is of little concern if the reconnaissance information
is relayed up to that point because of the UAV’s small size
and lack of strategically sensitive information. The military
commanders indicate that failing to receive the reconnaissance
information would require either a manned secondary mission
or the supported mission go without the information; both are
undesirable alternatives.
The most likely threats are a function of inputs from the
stakeholders and the experience of the attack analysts. In this
case, denial-of-service style attacks pose the greatest threat
to the failure of the UAV mission and would likely be an
adversary’s preferred method of attack. This is due to the
supportive nature of the tactical reconnaissance mission, which
would give an adversary little time to be aware of the mission
or plan a persistent attack to meaningfully impede mission
success.
Using the information from the WAR ROOM, we conduct
consequence and disturbance analysis using STPA-Sec as
described in Section IV. In this mission, the information
collected and distributed by the UAV is of more importance
than the UAV itself, hence the top priority unacceptable loss
is the loss of life or other resources due to the lack of or
inaccuracy of the UAV reconnaissance as indicated by the
WAR ROOM stakeholders. Furthermore, the WAR ROOM informs
the remaining unacceptable losses, which are placed in order
of decreasing priority (Table I). Next, the STPA-Sec analysis
produces a set of hazardous conditions that could lead to
these unacceptable losses (Table II). These hazards do not
necessarily lead to the unacceptable losses mentioned above;
the occurrence of these hazards, however, is an indicator of
possible full mission degradation.
After identifying the hazards that could lead to an unaccept-
able loss, we identify the conditions under which a particular
control action becomes hazardous. These control actions show
how different actors or controllers within the system alter the
behavior of a lower level component or controlled process. For
example, the UAV pilot sets and controls the flight plan of
the UAV. For the purposes of this paper, a fragment of the
control actions and their hazardous circumstances are outlined
(Table III). The component-level in this case refers to the
UAV’s subsystems: its control surfaces and payload.
We further identify a set of safety constraints for the subset
of control actions (Table IV). These constraints serve as
a mechanism to help prevent the system from entering a
hazardous state without the consent of the operator. This
information is modeled in SysML5 as system behavior that
needs to be preserved in order to ensure mission success.
While SysML provides a common framework to construct and
modify models by Systems Engineers, our analysis is exercised
by utilizing the graph structures and the evidence associated
with them.
For the UAV mission, we produce the graphs 푅, 퐹 , Σ, and 푆
but present only the ones applicable to the vulnerability analysis
and impact trace, namely, Σ and 푆 (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). Using
the information present in graph 퐴푉 we take the descriptors
of 푆, 푆 and through evidence and rel-evidence we producethe potential attacks (Fig. 6).
We now examine the system structure Σ and mission specifi-
cation, 푆. At this stage the analyst can already observe several
paths that are going to cause partial or full mission degradation.
The final piece of information to find the subsystems most
critical to the mission is the subgraph of 퐴푉 that’s constructed
through the WAR ROOM elicitation and further refined using
the system architecture (Fig. 6). This leads us to segment out
three subsystems: (1) Global Positioning System (GPS), (2)
XBee radio communication, and (3) GoPro Hero5 camera. The
first is concerned with the flight control system. The second
is concerned with the ground control station, flight control
system, and imagery payload. The third is concerned with just
the imagery payload. In a different simulated mission we might
have concluded that a different set of subsystems was critical
for the same system architecture, Σ.
GPS. The attack vectors associated with the GPS are
CVE-2016-6788 and CVE-2016-3801. While both of them
are targeting the Android operating system it is possible to
misconfigure the implementation of the UAV to be exploited in
such a manner. Since our analysis starts early and is exercised
often in a system’s lifecycle we can be conservative with
5The full SysML model will be distributed online and referenced here.
Because of the size of the diagrams we cannot include them here.
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Fig. 5. The 푆 graph represents the full mission specification including the requirements, the subset of applicable admissible behaviors, and the subset of
subsystems providing these behaviors. This graph is a one-to-one mapping with the SysML model but some of the information, e.g., mission requirement text
or structure descriptors Σ are encoded as attributes that can be accessed but are not visually shown. The losses (L) and hazards (H) are encoded in therequirements diagram and are derived from 푅. The safety constraints (SC) and control actions (CA) are encoded in activity diagrams and are derived from
퐹 . All other elements are part of the system structure Σ, which is encoded in block definition and internal block definition diagrams. Trace interactions are
top-to-bottom following our modeling methodology, while impact is measured bottom-to-top.
what we consider a vulnerability, so that we can report it
back to the WAR ROOM. The first attack vector can violate
the communication based on I2C based on the Mediatek 3339
present in the GPS and the drivers that are necessary for it to
operate. The second has to do with crafting an application to
increase the attackers privilege level within the system structure.
This would require operator action. The set
퐸GPS = {∅,CVE-2016-6788,CVE-2016-3801,
{CVE-2016-6788,CVE-2016-3801},
CWE-264,CAPEC-17}
contains all relevant evidence from AV for the GPS. It also
shows that attacks can be used individually or in combination.
Using this set of attacks in combination would yield complete
violation of the GPS but also the primary microcontroller
ARM STM32F4. Hence the two attacks used in sequence
would construct the attack chain,
푝GPS = (GPS
{CVE-2016-6788,CVE-2016-3801}
←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←→ ARM STM32F4)
.
This specific attack chain, if successful, would cause mission
degradation by violating the flight control system based on the
mission specification 푆 and would construct the impact trace,
Impact Trace푆GPS = (FCS → CA3.1 → SC3.1 → H3 → L2)⊔
(FCS → CA3.1 → SC3.1 → H3 → L3).
Furthermore, the CAPEC and CWE entries present in 퐸GPSinform the analyst about classes of weaknesses or general
attack patterns that might derive from the reported CVE
entries. These can then be encoded more concretely in the
requirements documentation and handled at the deployment
phase appropriately. In this case, CWE-264 is a category of
weaknesses for “Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls”
and CAPEC-17 an attack pattern “Accessing, Modifying or
Executing Executable Files.” This way, the analyst can report
the results more concretely to the stakeholders and discuss
about potential classes of attack vectors instead of specific
instances of them.
XBee. The imagery payload communicates with the
ground control station by utilizing the XBee radio module,
which in turn requires the use of the ZigBee protocol to
communicate to the Beaglebone Black imagery processor. A
potential attack that can violate the imagery processor is directly
correlated with the drivers it needs to run in order to properly
implement the ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. Two potential
attacks present in relevant evidence from 퐴푉 are CVE-2015-
8732 and CVE-2015-6244 (Fig. 6). The two attacks rely on two
separate bugs on the driver implementation but have the same
causal effect, namely, that an attacker can send a set of packets
that cause out-of-bound read and application crashes, which
results in a successful denial-of-service. The corresponding
CWE-20 “Improper Input Validation” and CAPEC-10 “Buffer
Overflow via Environment Variables” further define the possible
type of violation. Similarly with the GPS the evidence is,
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Fig. 6. An example subset of 퐴푉 that only contains relevant evidence, from rel-evidence, based on the mission specification 푆. (Text description of each node
is omitted for visualization purposes.)
퐸XBee = {∅,CVE-2015-8732,CVE-2015-6244,
CWE-20,CAPEC-10}.
In this instance the attack chain is reliant on the use of
multiple XBee devices,
푝XBee = (Imagery XBee
푎
←←←→ GCS XBee 푎←←←→ FCS XBee)
where 푎 = CVE-2015-8732 ∨ CVE-2015-6244 and the impact
traces associated with this violation are:
Impact Trace푆XBee = 푖GCS XBee ⊔ 푖FCS XBee ⊔ 푖Imagery XBee
where,
푖Imagery XBee = (Imagery XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC3.1 →
H3 → L2) ⊔ (Imagery XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC3.1 →
H3 → L3) ⊔ (Imagery XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC2.1 →
H1 → L1) ⊔ (Imagery XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC2.1 →
H2 → L1)
푖FCS XBee = (FCS XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC3.1 → H3 →
L2) ⊔ (FCS XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC3.1 → H3 →
L3) ⊔ (FCS XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC2.1 → H1 →
L1) ⊔ (FCS XBee → CA4.3 → SC4.3 → SC2.1 → H2 → L1)
푖GCS XBee = (Ground Control Station → CA2.1 → SC2.1 →
H1 → L1) ⊔ (Ground Control Station →
CA2.1 → SC2.1 → H2 → L1).
GoPro Hero5. The reconnaissance mission depends on
the camera. The GoPro Hero series is reported to be susceptible
to hijacking variables on start and restart operations that
are controlled by the ground control station and are likely
to be executed in flight. There are two attacks from the
relevant evidence in 퐴푉 applicable to this camera, CVE-
2014-6433 and CVE-2014-6434. The first allows any arbitrary
code to be run during the start command of the camera. The
corresponding CWE-94 “Improper Control of Generation of
Code (Code Injection)”, CAPEC-35 “Leverage Executable
Code in Non-Executable Files”, and CAPEC-77 “Manipulating
User-Controlled Variables” provide higher-level description of
the attack and its side effects. The second allows any arbitrary
code to be run on the camera during the restart command
and, hence, can cause an attack chain with the Beaglebone
Black or simply stop its operation in the duration of the mission.
Similarly with the first it is associated with CWE-78 “Improper
Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command”
and CAPEC-6 “Argument Injection.” Therefore, the evidence
퐸XBee = {∅,CVE-2014-6434},CWE-20,CAPEC-10,
CVE-2014-6433, {CVE-2014-6434,CVE-2014-6433}}.
No attack chain can be deduced from the given relevant
evidence for this case study. However, there still exists an
impact trace,
Impact Trace푆GoPro = (Imagery Payload → SC4.2 → SC2.1 →
H1 → L1) ⊔ (Imagery Payload → SC4.2 →
SC2.1 → H2 → L1).
Mission Impact. From the analysis above the vulnerable
paths are:
Vulnerable PathΣ = 푝GPS ⊔ 푝XBee.
Finally, we construct the complete impact trace that is going
to be reported to the WAR ROOM for further analysis,
Impact Trace푆 =Impact Trace푆GPS
⊔ Impact Trace푆XBee
⊔ Impact Trace푆GoPro .
In the case of further defenses or architectural changes are
present the analysis can be repeated to take them into account.
In this use-case, the system contains no specific set of defenses.
This means that it is vulnerable to the full set of relevant
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evidence. This is not an unrealistic assumption even for safety-
critical systems, since there exist deployed systems that consider
cybersecurity as an after-thought. This ends up promoting
reactive approaches to security, while MISSION AWARE is a
proactive methodology that is used to design security by design.
C. Discussion
MISSION AWARE can significantly minimize the amount of
inspected subsystems compared to a purely perimeter-oriented
approach while also still enabling mission success. MISSION
AWARE should scale to complex systems, and even systems-
of-systems, due to the modeling framework, the evidence
associated with the model, and the implication of the evidence
on the mission.
Model. The model is constructed in the SysML envi-
ronment, a language familiar and often used by Systems
Engineers to develop large-scale systems. The main motivation
behind using SysML is that a designer can easily capture all
the domains we utilize in this paper but also that diagram
modifications, for example the construction of the mission
specification after requirements, admissible behaviors, and
system architecture are defined, is possible without having
to reconstruct the domains or use different language semantics.
It also assists in the graph representation because it relies on a
visual language. Additionally, the model transformation, from
SysML to GraphML, does not cause any information loss.
Evidence. The evidence collected for a given analysis is
dependent on the mission and specifically the threats that are
expected to be counteracted during the mission. Therefore,
an exhaustive analysis of attack vectors is not necessary.
However, since MISSION AWARE is model-driven and does
not rely on a realized system, the descriptors associated with
the corresponding system might produce more evidence than
needed. This is the reasoning behind the relevant evidence.
Namely, relevant evidence is only the subset of those database
entries that is deemed to be truly applicable to the system.
This set, as is the case in this paper, is much smaller than
the collective amount of evidence an analyst might investigate
using a more perimeter-based approach.
Impact. We note that assessing the impact to the mission
does not (most of the time) require an exhaustive assessment
of the system. Rather, the analyst has confidence that there are
certain subsystems that are more important to the mission than
others—this is a direct result of using systems theory to find the
potential hazards in a top-down fashion from the higher level
mission hazards. Ideally, MISSION AWARE always produces a
set of vertices |푆| < |Σ| for the vertices that are derived from
Σ. This means that the subsystems directly correlated with
mission degradation are a smaller set that the whole system
structure.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The security community has developed approaches and
methods addressing the problem of vulnerability and security
assessment varying in intent, scope, and objectives. A relatively
recent surge of academic efforts attempt to exercise concepts
from dependable and safe computing to the realm of security.
Model-based quantitative security analysis with techniques
from dependability are motivated by Nicol et al. [12]. Safety
and security, however, can often be difficult to assure through
a purely quantitative framework [13], particularly when devel-
oping new systems or missions. In contrast, we use STAMP
to capture the potential hazardous scenarios the system might
face during its deployment and assess the security posture
qualitatively by using evidence and the model.
Hong et al. [6] present a comprehensive survey of graph-
theoretic approaches, including but not limited to attack trees,
attack defense trees, attack graphs, etc. While our elicitation
process and model can assist with any of the above tool-
based approaches, we gain new insights by finding the impact
to the mission instead of focusing just on the system itself
with no awareness of its expected service. Other graph-based
approaches target the compliance of policy or standard [14].
Further notable work in this area is described by Chen et
al. [15], where workflows are used to assure the security of
the system in a given scenario. Jauhar et al. produce security
argument graphs through CyberSAGE models to assess failure
scenarios in the smart grid [16].
Systems-theoretic approaches in the area of safety-critical
CPS include STPA-Sec [8] and STPA-SafeSec [17]. The former
is a general methodology that can be applied to any critical
system. The latter shows the application of STPA-SafeSec in
the context of the powergrid. In this work we utilize STPA-Sec
to identify the hazards and encode them in the model but
do not limit ourselves to the method. Instead, in this paper
the hazards are captured in a hierarchical model to assess the
impact of reported evidence, through vulnerability databases,
on a specific system architecture. Additionally, Jones et al.
propose a technique called System-Aware that follows a system
modeling methodology specific to risk analysis through voting
techniques using spreadsheets [18].
Ouchani et al. describe a model-based approach to security
using SysML [19]. Their approach relies in representing
both the model and the attack in SysML and is simulated
within that framework. Lemaire et al. propose a formal
verification scheme using vulnerability data and a SysML
system description [20]. Brunner et al. proposed a combined
model for safety and security based on Unified Modeling
Language (UML) diagrams [21].
In the context of space missions, Pecharich et al. propose
a mission-centric approach to analyzing the security posture
of systems and how to use the assessment to make informed
decisions about system deployment [22]. However, the method
and corresponding toolset relies on the construction of attack
trees. Similarly, Jakobson presents a more general motivation
for a shift from the current methods to mission-centric
cybersecurity [4], [23].
Finally, Mead and Woody use existing information about
malware to inform, at the early stages of a systems development,
the requirements elicitation process [24]. This constitutes an
evidence-based elicitation process but requires knowledge of
specific malware architectures and how they are used to infect
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the system under analysis. MISSION AWARE could integrate
these principles in the WAR ROOM.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a methodology, called
MISSION AWARE, that is grounded in systems theory as well as
evidence-based vulnerability assessment of the resulting system
architecture. MISSION AWARE provides strategic, model-based
cybersecurity analysis, where cybersecurity is framed according
to the mission that the technical system is intended to fulfill,
and what potential hazards the mission might face. The key
innovations of MISSION AWARE are:
1) a formal, traceable modeling framework that captures
the mission requirements, admissible behaviors, and
architectural elements;
2) model-driven identification of attack vectors that are
applicable to elements of system; and
3) reduction in the number of system elements that need
to be analyzed in order to assure mission success
by explicitly focusing the evidence related to mission
objectives.
These innovations are achieved by connecting the mission
requirements, the admissible functional behaviors, and the
system structure that can fulfill the defined service via a
guided elicitation process we termed the WAR ROOM. Both the
elicitation process and the resulting outputs are grounded in
systems theory and leverage recent work in safety analysis.
All of this information is formally encoded in a mission
specification, which uses set-theoretic and graph-theoretic
formalisms. The security posture of the overall mission is then
directly traced to the security posture of the critical subsystems
that relate to potential mission degradation. We assess the
security posture of individual subsystems, and their connections,
through the use of vulnerability repositories using CAPEC,
CWE, and CVE.
As a final observation we note the experience of using
a systematic, model-driven process to conduct vulnerability
analysis often yields more information than just quantifying
the vulnerability aspects of the system. The process itself is an
iterative learning experience, allowing circumspection into how
a system behaves in response to potential threats and attacks.
Therefore, with mission-oriented perspectives we attempt to
bring “what-if” analysis across the wide range of stakeholders
from command level to acquisition to engineering support. The
inclusion of this information into review processes and mission
activities can enlighten how managers and operators implement
defense capabilities from a mission perspective.
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